Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice by Zimmermann, Andreas
Penn State International Law Review
Volume 8
Number 1 Dickinson Journal of International Law Article 2
1989
Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of
Justice
Andreas Zimmermann
Follow this and additional works at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr
Part of the International Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn State Law eLibrary. It has been accepted for inclusion in Penn State International Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Penn State Law eLibrary. For more information, please contact ram6023@psu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zimmermann, Andreas (1989) "Ad Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice," Penn State International Law Review: Vol. 8:
No. 1, Article 2.
Available at: http://elibrary.law.psu.edu/psilr/vol8/iss1/2




Prior to 1982, the provision in the Court's Statute for chambers
of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) was practically a dead
letter.' Recently, however, the attitude of litigant States has signifi-
cantly changed. So far three judgments have been rendered by ad-
hoc chambers' and one other case is actually pending before this
chamber.3 Due to the enlarged practice of the Court, the interest in
the literature has recently increased to a considerable extent."
Nevertheless, some questions have not yet been dealt with, such
as the relation between the chamber procedure and intervening
States and the delimitation of the competencies between the full
Court (and its President) and the chamber. Therefore, it is worth-
* Eberhard-Karls-Universitt Tubingen, School of Law 1986; LL.M., Harvard Law
School, 1989.
1. Ostrihansky, Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 37 I.C.L.Q. 30 (1988).
2. Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area (Can. v. U.S.),
1984 I.C.J. 246 (Judgment of Oct. 12) and Frontier Dispute (Burkinao Faso v. Mali), 1986
I.C.J. 554 (Judgment of Dec. 22).
3. Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (USA v. Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 13 (Order July 20,
1989), and Case concerning the Island and Maritime Frontier (El Salvador v. Honduras),
1987 I.C.J. 10 (Order of May 8, 1987).
4. In general see: Oda, Further Thoughts on the Chamber Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 82 AJIL 556 (1988); Ostrihansky, supra note 1; Pillepich, Les Cham-
bres, in LA JURIDICTION INTERNATIONALE (Soc. Franc. Dt. Int., ed.) (1988); Schwebel, Ad
hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice, 81 AJIL 831 (1987); Mosler, The Ad
Hoc Chambers of the International Court of Justice - Evaluation after Five Years of Expe-
rience, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PERPLEXITY-ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF SH.
ROSENNE (1989).
In relation to the Gulf of Maine Case see Zoller, La premiere constitution d'une chambre
spiciale par la CIJ, 86 Rev. G6n. Dt. Int. Publ. 305 (1982); Brauer, International Conflict
Resolution: The ICJ Chambers and the Gulf of Maine Dispute, 23 VA. J. INT'L L. 463 (1983);
Oellers-Frahm, Die Bildung einer Ad-hoc Kammer des IGH gemlss Artikel 26 Abs. II des
Statuts, 21 Archiv des V61kerrechts 216 (1983);
In relation to the Frontier Dispute Case see Gautron, La creation d'une chambre au sein
de la CIJ - Msures conservatoires et Mediation dans le different frontalier entre le Burkina
Faso et le Mali, 32 Ann Franc. Dt. Int. 192 (1986); D6caux, L'arrt de la Chambre de la CIJ
dans I'affaire du different frontalier, id., 215;
See also, M. BEDJAOUI & J. PEREZ, UNIVERSALSME ET REGIONALISM AU SEIN DE LA
COUR INTERNATIJONALE DE JUSTICE: LA CONSTITUTION DE CHAMBRES "AD HOC" 155-71
(1988): A. SAAVEDRA, LA CREACION Y EL FUNCIONAMIENTO DE LAS SALAS "AD HOC DEL TRI-
BUNAL INTERNACIONAL DE JUSTICIA 1285-1303 (1988).
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while dealing with these and other problems in view of the future
litigation before such chambers.
II. Historical Development
A. Draft Convention for the Establishment of a Court of Arbitral
Justice
This proposal, brought forward during the 1907 Peace Confer-
ence at the Hague, envisaged in its Arts. 6 and 18, summary proce-
dure. For this purpose, a special 'd6l~gation' was foreseen. If the par-
ties agreed, they would have had the possibility of gaining access to
a more limited entity to decide their dispute. Nevertheless, under the
Art. 20 Draft Convention, each party had the right to nominate one
judge of the Court to participate in the proceedings of the delega-
tion. While this project never saw life, it nonetheless inspired the
Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ).
B. Permanent Court of International Justice
Under the Statute of the PCIJ, several types of chambers were
foreseen. Art. 29 regulated the Chamber of Summary Procedure.
This chamber convened twice during the lifetime of the PCIJ. In
1924, it had to deal with a dispute between Greece and Bulgaria as
to the meaning of Art. 179, Annex, Par. 4 of the Peace Treaty of
Neuilly.5 Three months later, Greece requested an interpretation of
this judgment under Art. 60 of the Statute. The same chamber dealt
with this request."
In the Serbian Loans Case in 1928, a reference to the Chamber
of Summary Procedure was suggested, but the Serbian Government
thought it to be unacceptable in view of the importance of the case.7
The chamber also met once in 1935 in connection with a later with-
drawn request to appoint members of an arbitral tribunal.' Finally,
some treaties provided for the jurisdiction of the chamber, either if
both parties agreed to refer the case to the Chamber for Summary
Procedure,9 or upon unilateral request by one of the parties. 10
5. PCIJ (ser. A), No. 3.
6. The request was, however, not admitted. It was doubtful whether the chamber or the
full Court would be competent to hear such request; this problem was addressed during the
revision of the Rules of Court of the PCIJ in 1926; it is now clarified by Article 100 Rules of
the Court of the ICJ of 1978 [hereinafter Rules 1978].
7. PCIJ, (ser. C), No. 16-111, pp. 792, 793, 808; this contradicts the view that litigation
by chambers of the World Court is regarded as highly prestigious; but see, Rhee, Equitable
Solutions to the Maritime Boundary between the United States and Canada in the Gulf of
Maine, 75 AJIL 590, 596 (1981); Brauer, supra note 4, at 475.
8. PCIJ, (ser. E), No. 11, 152.
9. Art. 12 Trait6 de Commerce et de Navigation entre le Danemark et les Pays-Bas,
Oct. 31, 1931: PCIJ, (ser. D), No. 6, p. 629.
10. Art. VI, Trait6 de Commerce entre le Danemark et la Bolivie, Nov. 9, 1931, id.
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However, even the introduction of the system of judges ad hoc
for the Chamber of Summary Procedure during the amendment of
the Statute in 192911 did not render the chamber procedure more
popular.1 2 The reasons for this non-use may be seen in the fact that
the parties to a possible dispute had no influence on the composition
of the chamber. Another reason for the ad hoc system's failure to
improve that situation" was that the parties had the same right
when referring the case to the full Court. 4 Furthermore, the pro-
ceedings were not necessarily shorter than regular proceedings, since
further written communications beyond the single memorials could
be filed, if the parties agreed to do so,15 and oral proceedings could
be held. 6 Finally, in case of an urgency, the broad powers of the
Court under Art. 41 Statute provided a sufficient safeguard for the
rights of the concerned party.
In addition to this Chamber for Summary Procedure, the Stat-
ute of the PCIJ also provided for chambers for labor cases (Art. 26)
and for a chamber dealing with transit and communications
problems (Art. 27). However, neither have held a meeting. 7 There-
fore, the Statute of the ICJ left it to the Court's discretion to form
chambers for particular categories of disputes and refers to the
above-mentioned cases only as examples for such categories. 8
Notably, a proposal during the drafting of the Statute of the
PCIJ which authorized parties to submit their case to a panel of
three judges, or to one sole judge, chosen by them from among the
members of the Court, was rejected on the basis that such a method
II. Art. 31(4) Statute.
12. Under the Statute of the ICJ, the Chamber of Summary Procedure, while annually
formed by the Court, Art. 29 Statute, has never been used.
13. This was contrary to the expectations when that provision was amended, M. HUD-
SON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 348, n.94 (2nd ed., 1943).
14. The only difference would be that the importance of the vote of such judge would
have been higher.
15. This happened in the Treaty of Neuilly Case, G. GUYOMAR, COMMENTAIRE Du
REGLEMENT DE LA CIJ 586 (2nd ed., 1983).
16. Art. 69 Rules 1922; Art. 92 Rules 1978.
17. In the S.S. Wimbledon Case, the PCIJ considered the parties' attention to Art. 27,
but decided in the negative, PCIJ, ser. E, no. 3, p. 189; such a question was not even raised in
the Order Commission Case, nor in the Oscar Chinn Case, M. HUDSON, supra note 13, at 348,
n.94.
18. Art. 26(l) Statute; several categories of chambers have been proposed, e.g., "cham-
bers concerning the protection of the environment," Lachs, The Revised Procedure of the
International Court of Justice, 21, 43 ESSAYS ON THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE INTERNATIONAL
LEGAL ORDER, (Kalshoven ed. 1980) "chambers for the settlement of disputes arising out of
space activities," Poulantzas, The Chambers of the International Court of Justice and the
Judicial Settlement of Disputes: The Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of
Maine Area Case, 63 Rev. Dt. Int. 323 (1985). The proposal for a chamber for the law of the
sea, Lachs, id., has become somewhat obsolete through the creation of the detailed mechanism
for the settlement of disputes under the new Convention for the Law of the Sea. See S.
WASUM, DER INTERNATIONALE SEEGERICHTSHOF IM SYSTEM DER OBLIGATORISCHEN
STREITBEILEGUNGSVERFAHREN DER SEERECHTSKONVENTION (1984), passim, in particular 66-
72 as far as the chambers of the Tribunal for the Law of the Sea are concerned.
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would too closely resemble arbitration.19 However, a somewhat simi-
lar proposal received more attention during the drafting of the Stat-
ute of the ICJ.
C. International Court of Justice
In the United Nations Committee of Jurists, charged with
drafting the Statute of the future ICJ, Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, the
representative of the United Kingdom, proposed to grant the Court
with "a general faculty to constitute special chambers in such cases
as may seem appropriate."2 0 This proposal was later modified in ac-
cordance with a United States proposition which can now be found
in Art. 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute:
The Court may from time to time form a chamber for deal-
ing with a particular case. The number of judges to constitute
such a chamber shall be determined by the Court with the ap-
proval of the parties.2"
This provision was regarded as being marginally useful22 since it
would, under certain circumstances, facilitate recourse to the
Court.23 However, Judge Hudson, arguably the foremost expert on
World Court procedure at that time, realized that the system of such
ad hoc chambers would constitute a complete departure from the
system of chambers established by the Statute of the PCIJ,24 since it
would involve the parties in the decisions pertaining to the size and
composition of the chamber.25
Despite this new provision in the Statute, the Rules of 1946 set
out in Art. 24 dealt only briefly and conservatively with chambers,26
conforming to the 1936 Rules of Court of the PCIJ. Therefore, since
the ad hoc chambers were not adequately covered by the procedural
law of the Court, growing unease has resulted from this neglect.27
19. PCIJ, Advisory Committee of Jurists, Procbs-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the
Committee, at 526; see also the Swiss proposal of 1919 under which the Court would have
consisted of a panel of 15 judges and where each of the parties would have been able to reject
five of them, supra note 13, at 147; M. Ricci-Busatti favored a panel of 15-20 judges from
which ad-hoc tribunals should be formed, PCIJ, id., at 177, 183.
20. 4 G. SCHWARZENBERGER, INTERNATIONAL LAW As APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNALS: INTERNATIONAL JUDICIAL LAW 291 (1986); Schwebel, supra note 4, at 832, n.4.
21. The proposal was adopted with twenty-one votes in favor - none against, UNCO,
vol. XIV, p. 202. For a detailed description of the drafting history see Schwebel, supra note 4,
at 832-835; Oda, supra note 4, at 560-61.
22. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 291.
23. UNCIO, vol. XV, p. 834; S. ROSENNE, PROCEDURE IN THE INTERNATIONAL COURT
OF JUSTICE 40 (1983).
24. UNCIO, vol. XIV, p. 199.
25. Schwebel, supra note 4, at 834, interpreting Hudson's statement in that sense.
26. Id.
27. Id.; Hyde, A Special Chamber of the International Court of Justice - An Alterna-
tive to Ad Hoc Arbitration, 62 AJIL 439 (1968): '[...] unused possibilities [...]"; con-
firmed by Jessup, To Form a More Perfect United Nations, 129 Hague Reccuil 1, 21 (1970 I).
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The concern surfaced in the debate of the Sixth Committee of
the General Assembly in 1970-71, in which States were given an
opportunity to express their ideas about this topic. 8 As a result, the
Court, which in 1967 had formed a Court's Revision of Rules Com-
mittee, significantly reframed the relevant provisions of the rules
both in 1972 and in 1978. These changes involved two major
elements.
The first and most significant innovation now obliges the Presi-
dent of the Court to ascertain the views of the parties as to the com-
position of the chamber and to report to the Court accordingly.
Based on the resulting consequences of this provision,29 the parties to
a case are now clearly endowed with at least a strong influence re-
garding the composition of the chamber:
[. .. From a practical point of view, it is difficult to con-
ceive that [ . .] those Members who have been suggested by
the parties would not be elected. For that it would be necessary
for a majority of the Members of the Court to decide to disre-
gard the expressed wishes of the parties. This would be highly
unlikely, since it would simply result in compelling the parties to
resort to an outside tribunal."0
The second new feature deals with the composition of the cham-
ber over time. Unlike the cases heard before the full Court, where a
replaced judge shall only discharge his duties upon the completion of
a particular phase, members of an ad hoc chamber shall continue to
sit in all phases of the case. (Art. 17, para. 4 Rules 1978). a1 This is
particularly important in view of the experiences of both the Barce-
28. See the overview in id.; Rosenne, The 1972 Revision of the Rules of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 8 ISR. L. REV., 197, 213 (1973): "[... strong desire on the part of
many Governments that parties to contentious cases should be able to agree on the actual
composition of an ad hoc tribunal [...]"; detailed references in Schwebel, supra note 4, at
836-37.
29. See infra V, C.
30. Jiminez de Ar6chaga, The Amendments to the Rules of Procedure of the Interna-
tional Court of Justice, 67 AJIL, 1, 2-3 (1973). This view was confirmed by the practice of
the Court of the Gulf of Maine Case, but see also the Dissenting Opinions of Judge Morozov,
1982 ICJ Rep. I I and Judge EI-Khani, 1982 ICJ Rep. 12; the view of Ar6chaga is shared by
(former or actual) members of the Court: Schwebel, supra note 4, at 841; Oda, supra note 4,
at 559 and his declaration in the El Salvador/Honduras Case, 1987 ICJ Rep. 13; Mosler, The
International Court of Justice at its Present Stage of Development, 5 DALHOUSIE L.J. 545,
559 (1979); P6tren, Some Thoughts on the Future of the International Court of Justice, 6
Netherlands Yb. Int'l L. 59 (1975); but see Evensen, The International Court of Justice Main
Characteristics and its Contribution to the Development of the Modern Law of Nations, 57
NORDIC J. INT'L L. 1, 9 (1988): "In practice, the Court has been responsive to the views of the
Parties."
31. The importance of this provision is stressed by Mosler, Aspekte des Verfahrens-
rechts des Internationalen Gerichtshofes, 256 VOLKERRECHT UND RECHTSPHILOSOPHIE-IN-
TERNATIONALE FESTSCHRIFT FUR ST. VEROSTA, (Fischer, Kdck, Verdross, eds. 1980). The
same procedure had been proposed by Switzerland and Sweden for both the full Court and the
chambers. See Dupuy, La Rkforme du Rfglement de la Cour Internationale de Justice, 18
Ann Franc. Dt. Int. 265, 273 (1972).
Fall 1989]
6 DICKINSON JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
lona Traction 2 and the South West Africa (First/Second Phase)
Cases.33 However, while these advantages are important, ad hoc
chambers provide other advantages for the parties with regard to
both arbitral tribunals and the full bench of the ICJ.
III. Comparison between Ad Hoc Chambers of the ICJ and other
Judicial Bodies
A. Ad hoc Chambers v. Arbitral Tribunals
In the 1970's and 1980's, on three occasions, States had re-
course to dispute-settlement by arbitral tribunals, consisting either
partly or completely of members of the ICJ. In the Beagle Channel
Arbitration between Chile and Argentina, Chile had favored arbitra-
tion by the British Government, while Argentina, one the other
hand, due to its political difficulties with Great Britain in regard to
the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, preferred recourse to the ICJ.3 4
Eventually, the parties agreed to settle their dispute before a Court
of Arbitration composed of five ICJ judges. Notably, their designa-
tion was not influenced primarily by their personal qualifications, but
by their membership on the ICJ.3 5 While the seat and the registry of
the tribunal were located in Geneva,36 the Court also utilized the
Peace Palace at the Hague for a meeting. 17
A second example refers to the arbitral tribunal chosen to re-
solve the continental shelf boundary dispute between the United
Kingdom and France.38 However, in this instance, only two of the
five judges were members of the ICJ. More likely than not, these
ICJ judges were chosen for the simple reason they were nationals of
the two parties involved.
3 9
Finally, in the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary between
Guinea and Guinea Bissau, the affinity to an ad hoc chamber of the
ICJ reached its most striking point.4 0 In this case, the Tribunal con-
sisted of three ICJ judges, among them the former President of the
32. 1964 I.C.J. 6 and 1970 I.C.J. 3.
33. 1962 i.C.J. 319 and 1966 I.C.J. 6. See also, M. HUDSON, supra note 13, at 350, for
cases where the composition of the PCIJ changed significantly during different phases.
34. F.V., The Beagle Channel Arbitration, 71 A.J.I.L. 733, 734 (1977).
35. Id. at 735; the judges chosen were Dillard (USA); Fitzmaurice (UK), Gros
(France), Onyeama (Nigeria) and Petren (Sweden).
36. The registrar was Prof. Ph. Cahier, Institut de Hautes Etudes Internationales.
37. 1 J. WETTER, THE INTERNATIONAL ARBITRAL PROCESS 297 (1979). A meeting was
held on Nov. 29, 1974.
38. For the text of both, the compromis and the decision, see UNRIAA, vol. XVIII, I.
39. In fact, Judges Gros (France) and Waldock (UK) were both nominated by their
respective home countries.
40. This is underlined by David, La Sentence Arbitrale du 14 Fbvrier 1985 sur la D -




Court.41 While the seat for this matter was originally determined to
be Geneva, 42 the parties agreed to move it to the Hague.4' As to the
procedure, it was agreed that the Rules of Court of the ICJ would be
applicable. Mr. Pillepich, then Deputy-Registrar of the ICJ, was
named registrar of the Tribunal.""
These examples demonstrate the slight distinction that exists be-
tween an arbitral tribunal and an ad hoc chamber of ICJ judges. Ad
hoc chambers of the ICJ, however, have some advantages when com-
pared to arbitral tribunals.
First, even if an arbitral tribunal consists exclusively of mem-
bers of the ICJ, its award is not a judgment of the ICJ under Art. 94
of the UN-Charter. In contrast, judgments rendered by an ICJ ad
hoc chamber are considered as binding as a judgment rendered by
the Court itself (Art. 27 Statute). Thus, an arbitral award may not
be enforced by the Security Council, as evidenced by the Beagle
Channel Arbitration.45
However, it is important to note that the Security Council has
yet to take significant steps toward enforcing a judgment of the ICJ.
Moreover, if one of the permanent members of the Security Council
is a party to the dispute before the Court, the action may be illusory
in view of Art. 27 UN-Charter.46
Second, from a political standpoint, the higher visibility of the
Court on the political stage, when compared to an arbitral tribunal,
encourages compliance with its judgments. 47 Consequently, the ICJ
is regarded as more prestigious, 4 8 which makes it easier for the liti-
gant Governments to justify a negative outcome to their respective
domestic public.49
Yet another advantage for the parties lies in the fact that both
the substantive and procedural law applied are - at least to a cer-
tain extent - predictable. As to the procedural law, both the Stat-
41. The composition was: Judge Bedjaoui, Judge Mbaye and Judge Lachs.
42. Art. 3 of the Special Agreement; See 89 Rev. G~n. Dt. Int'. Publ. 484 (1985).
43. Art. I of the Complementary Agreement of Oct. 18, 1983, supra note 42 at 492: the
parties referred to the "multiple advantages of the new seat."
44. Art. 5, para. 2 Special Agreement empowered the tribunal to choose its own regis-
trar, see 89 Rev. Gen. Dt. Int. Publ. 484 (1985).
45. Hambro, Will the Revised Rules of Court Lead to Greater Willingness on the Part
of Prospective Clients?, I THE FUTURE OF THE ICJ 365, 367 (Gross, ed. 1980). It took an-
other mediation by the Pope to finally settle the dispute. See 89 Rev, G~n. Dt. Int. Publ. 397-
400 (1985); S. ROSENNE, supra note 45, at 41 argues that a reference to Art. 94 UN-Charter
could be included into a special agreement.
46. See. e.g., Security Council Draft Resolution concerning the implementation of the
judgment in the United States-Nicaragua Case, vetoed by the United States; this problem is
diminished when - as in ad hoc chamber cases - the dispute is brought before the Court by
way of Special Agreement.
47. Brauer, supra note 4, at 475.
48. Id. Rhee, supra note 7, at 596.
49. Rovine, The National Interest and the World Court, I FUTURE OF THE ICJ, supra
note 45, at 322.
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ute and the Rules are determined in advance and clarified by the
prior extensive practice of the Court itself. Besides, States may only
depart from the Rules upon an agreement between the parties and
the chamber.50 As to the substantive law, while the stare decisis
principle does not apply under Art. 59 of the Statute, the jurispru-
dence of the Court is highly relied upon in future court proceedings
in accordance with Art. 38, lit. d of the Statute. Therefore, States
can generally foresee the basic principles the Court will apply. Fur-
thermore, the services of the Court's Registry are at the disposal of
the Chamber. 1
Finally, the litigation before an ad hoc chamber is less expensive
than before an arbitral tribunal. This is due to the fact that under
Art. 33 of the Statute, the expenses of the proceedings are borne by
the ICJ budget fixed by the United Nations, to which the litigants
contribute as members under the Statute. Thus, parties only have to
bear their own costs. 2 This may be a significant advantage53 in par-
ticular for less developed countries, and in situations where disputes
will last for a long period of time.
Thus proceedings before ad hoc chambers have some important
advantages when compared to arbitral tribunals. From the perspec-
tive of potential parties, they may also be more advantageous than
proceedings before the full Court.
B. Ad Hoc Chambers v. The Full Court
In addition to the aforementioned advantages relating to the
composition of the chambers,54 it may be also easier for an ad hoc
chamber, with its limited number of members, to choose a language
other than English or French as a working language. 5 Moreover, the
ad hoc chamber is more flexible than the whole Court, making deci-
sions, pursuant to Article 22, paragraph 1 of the Statute and Article
55 of the 1978 Rules, to hold proceedings at a place other than at
the Court seat considerably easier.56
50. Art. 101 Rules 1978; Art. 93-97 Rules dealing with judgments are mandatory under
all circumstances.
51. Mosler, supra note 30, at 599.
52. Under Art. 64 of the Statute, the Court may burden one party also with the other's
party costs.
53. Ar6chaga, supra note 30, at 3; Zoller, supra not 4, at 311 n. 19; Mosler, supra note
30, at 558.
54. See supra note 3.
55. Hambro, supra note 45, at 369.
56. Mosler, supra note 30, at 560.
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IV. Submission of a Case to an Ad Hoc Chamber
A. Forms of Agreement of the Parties to Submit to a Chamber
Article 26, paragraph 3 of the Statute stipulates that cases shall
be heard by a chamber if the parties so request. In three out of the
four chamber proceedings, which up to now have been dealt with by
the ICJ, both the jurisdiction of the Court and the request to form a
chamber were based on a special agreement.5 7 However, in the Case
concerning Elettronica Sicula S.P.A., the United States, by a unilat-
eral application on February 6, 1987, initiated an action against It-
aly, requesting the Court to form a chamber.5 8 Italy, while question-
ing the admissibility of the application, 59 subsequently accepted the
proposal presented by the United States Government. °
Under the Statute of the PCIJ, it had been doubtful whether
proceedings before the Chamber for Summary Proceedings could be
instituted only by means of a special agreement.6 " This was due to
the fact that prior to 1926, the Court had decided to apply the sys-
tem of simultaneous submission of documents only to cases in which
the suit was brought by special agreement. Pursuant to the rule gov-
erning summary procedure, a provision required, without exception,
such a simultaneous submission."2 As a result, a unilateral action to
bring a case before such a chamber was seemingly excluded.6" How-
ever, the changes made in 1926 accounted for different ways in
which cases may be submitted for summary procedure. This sug-
gested therefore, the possibility of an application as the document
instituting summary procedure.6"
On the other hand, under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute
of the ICJ, a case can be heard by a chamber if the parties so re-
quest. This seems to indicate that the necessary agreement of the
parties can take different forms, such as a special agreement; a
clause of a treaty under which a state might bring an action before
an ad hoc chamber; an application with later acceptance by the re-
spondent; or, finally, declarations under Art. 36, paragraph 2 of the
57. For the text of the Special Agreement see:
Gulf of Maine Case: 20 I.L.M. 1377 (1981)
Frontier Dispute: 22 I.L.M. 1253 (1983)
Land, Island, Maritime Frontier: text not available in
I.L.M.
58. 1987 I.C.J. 3.
59. 1987 I.C.J. 185 (Order of Nov. 17, 1987).
60. Letter dated February 13, 1987.
61. This was the opinion of Judge Anzilotti during the revision of the Rules of Court in
1926, PCIJ, (ser. D), No. 2 (Add.), at 182.
62. Registrar of the PCIJ. PCIJ, id.
63. But cf. statement by the President of the PCIJ, id.
64. M. HUDSON, THE PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 284 (1st ed.,
1934).
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Statute, which foresee the use of such a chamber. This liberal inter-
pretation is confirmed by Article 17, paragraph 1 of the 1978 Rules,
under which a request for the formation of a chamber may be filed
at any time until the closure of the written proceedings. Moreover,
the second sentence of the same provision specifically provides for a
request to be made by one party. However, accepting the jurisdiction
of the Court under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute, and con-
ditioning such an acceptance on the disputant's agreement to use
such a chamber may be incompatible with the Statute itself.
B. Exclusion of the Full Court by Reservations to Declarations
under Art. 36(2) Statute
Several authors, among them former State Department Legal
Adviser Leigh,65 have proposed that the United States should resub-
mit itself to the jurisdiction of the ICJ, but that such a resubmittal
should be accompanied with a reservation that would apply the pro-
cedure used by the US and Canada in the Gulf of Maine Case to the
Optional Clause System:
The Government of the United States accepts [...] the ju-
risdiction of the International Court of Justice in any dispute
providing that, at the instigation of either party: (1) a dispute
shall be submitted to a chamber of the International Court of
Justice consisting of such members of the Court as are elected
by the Court in accordance with the preferences of the parties
expressed in an agreement between them and that if no such
agreement is reached or the Court fails to elect the judges
named in the agreement, the Court shall not [...1 have juris-
diction over the dispute [. . I"
It is doubtful, however, whether such a reservation would be compat-
ible with the optional clause under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the
Statute.
As a matter of principle, it is generally acknowledged that
States have the right to make reservations to declarations under Ar-
ticle 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute.67 This is confirmed by the legis-
65. Leigh, The Use of Special Chambers, (memorandum to the American Society Inter-
national Lawyers panel on the ICJ, Sept. 26, 1985; M. Leigh/St. Ramsey, Confidence in the
Court: It Need not be a "Hollow Chamber", THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A
CROSSROAD 106, 117-22 (Damrosch, ed. 1987). Gardner, Testimony before the Committee on
Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate, Dec. 11, 1985; Gardner, US Termination of the Compulsory
Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, 24 COLUM. J. TRANS. L.421, 426-27 (1986);
Ende, Reaccepting the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice: A New
Proposal for a New United States Declaration, 61 WASH. L. REV. 1145, 1171 (1986). Another
specific advantage on the domestic level would be that under such proposal - unlike as in
cases of special agreements - future disputes could be submitted to the Court without con-
gressional approval. See Leigh/St. Ramsey, supra 120, n.42.
66. See T. FRANCK, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (Appendix) (1986).
67. Hambro, Some Observations on the Compulsory Jurisdiction of the International
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lative history of the Statute 8 and specifically by Article 36, para-
graph 5 of the Statute, under which declarations shall be deemed to
confer jurisdiction to the ICJ "in accordance with their terms."69
However, Article 92 of the Charter and Article 1 of the ICJ Statute
require the Court to "function in accordance with the provisions" of
said Statute.70 The Court simply cannot depart from any binding
norms or rules of the Charter and its Statute. Moreover, the Court
has even ruled that it cannot act pursuant to a compromise stipulat-
ing that only certain judges can sit.7I This may, however, not be true
for a chamber reservation, for example, which specifically invokes a
procedure provided for in the Statute and the Rules.
72
An even more serious question surrounds whether the proposed
declaration would create a legal obligation at all.73 Since the govern-
ment, which issued the declaration with this reservation in question,
could always obstruct an agreement pertaining to the composition of
the chamber, one could question not only the validity and enforce-
ability of this instrument, but also whether the Court should even
take notice of such a declaration. 4 It remains unclear, however, as
to what needs to be recognized for an obligation to be considered
substantive. It can be argued that the term "obligation" in para-
graph 2 is more of a description of what is recognized than a re-
quirement of what should be recognized. 75 Furthermore, from the
obligations incurred by the State under the exercise of the incidental
jurisdiction once the Court is validly seised,76 the State issuing the
declaration is also under an obligation to negotiate in good faith to
reach an agreement regarding the composition of the chamber. This
Court of Justice, 25 B. YB. INT'L L. 133, 148 (1948) (referring to State practice); see also S.
ROSENNE, DOCUMENTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, passim, (2nd. ed 1979).
This was already confirmed by the PCIJ (ser. A/B), No. 74 at 23 (Phosphates in Morocco),
"[.I jurisdiction only exists within the limits within which it has been accepted."
68. UNCIO, vol. XIII, 559, 591.
69. Some of these declarations did, indeed contain reservations; Crawford, The Legal
Effect of Automatic Reservations to the Jurisdiction of the International Court, 50 BRIT. YB.
INT'L. L. 63, 79 n.7 (1979).
70. 1947/48 1.C.J. 26; 1953 I.C.J. 122. Already the PCIJ acted that way although it
was not bound by the express provisions of the Covenant and its Statute requiring it to act in
accordance with the Statute, see PCIJ, (ser. A), No. 22, at 12; (ser. A/B), No. 46, at 161;
(ser. B), No. 5, at 29.
71. PCIJ (Ser. A), No. 22, at 12 (Free Zones) - however, ad hoc chambers with an
influence of the parties as to their composition were not foreseen under the Statute of the
PCIJ; but see 1957 I.C.J. 44-46 (Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, Norwegian Loans).
72. Ende, supra note 65, at 1180.
73. Art. 36, paragraph 2 specifically refers to the motion of an obligation as a necessary
element of a declaration under that rule.
74. See 1957 I.C.J. 48 (Opinion of Judge Lauterpacht, Norwegian Loans); 1959 I.C.J.
Rep. 106-07 (Interhandel) related to the Conally (-type) reservation. See also 1957 I.C.J. 68
(Opinion of Judge Guerrero) and 1959 I.C.J. 56 (Opinion of Judge Spender).
75. Crawford, supra note 69, at 75.
76. Briggs, The Incidental Jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice as Com-
pulsory Jurisdiction, passim, VOLKERRECHT UND RECHTLICHES WELTBILD - FESTSCHRIFT
FUR A. VERDROSS, 87, (v.d. Heydte, Seidl-Hohenveldern eds. 1960).
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can be inferred from the fact that such declaration, coupled with a
corresponding second declaration, would constitute a pactum de
negotiando.1 Therefore, even by the reservation in question, the is-
suing State would still incur an obligation under Article 36, para-
graph 2. Despite this result, the reservation may be incompatible
with the Statute for some other reasons.
Unlike other reservations, the proposed condition would not re-
strict the Court's jurisdiction ratione materiae, personae or temporis.
It seeks to impose positive obligations on the other party after the
Court has been already validly seised.78 On its face, this fails to cre-
ate a problem with the principle of sovereign equality, since the
other party would also be potentially able to rely on that reservation
pursuant to the principle of reciprocity. However, one can argue that
such a clause, by the will of the other party, divests a State of the
protection of the full fifteen-member Court. 79 Furthermore, Article
26, paragraph 3 of the Statute stipulates that cases shall be heard by
a Chamber only if the parties so request. Thus, the power of one
State to initiate the chamber procedure alone is seemingly excluded.
This is further confirmed by Article 91, paragraph 1 of the Rules
which states that the request to form a chamber will be given effect
only if the parties are in agreement in that respect.8"
Finally, such reservation would also give one party the unilat-
eral power to withdraw the case upon the Court's failure to elect the
judges agreed upon by the parties.81 This contradicts the provisions
pertaining to the discontinuance of case proceedings under Articles
88 and 89 of the Rules which, in principle, require the participation
of both parties in such a discontinuance or withdrawal.82 This re-
quirement was acknowledged by the United States and Canada in
the Gulf of Maine Case.83 In this dispute, the parties agreed to
jointly notify the ICJ of a discontinuance of the proceedings in the
77. To a certain extent, it is doubtful whether such corresponding declarations are gov-
erned by the law of treaties, Crawford, supra note 69, at 76-77; but see Anzilotti, PCIJ (ser.
A/B), No. 77, at 87 (Electric Company of Sofia): "[...] an agreement came into existence
between these two States accepting the jurisdiction. This agreement . . . referred to as the
Declarations . . ."; and Judge Urratia: ". . . equivalent in law to an international agreement
... " id., at 103; see also Gross, Compulsory Jurisdiction under the Optional Clause, THE
INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROAD, supra note 65. Special reference should
be made to the US-Nicaragua Case (1987). As to the obligation to negotiate in good faith
under a pactum de negotiando, see Beyerlin, Pactum de Contrahendo-Pacctum de Negotiando,
7 ENCL. PUBL. INT. L. 371 (Bernhardt, ed. 1984).
78. Ende, supra note 65, at 1181.
79. Hyde, supra note 27, at 440.
80. See also Ostrihansky, supra note 1, at 42: "... powers common to each party-to
consent to litigation before a chamber . . ."
81. See supra note 66 and accompanying text (proposed reservation).
82. See G. WEGEN, VERGLEICH UND KLAGROCKNAHME IM INTERNATIONALEN PROZESS,
passim (1987).
83. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 8:1
AD Hoc CHAMBERS
event that either party terminated the Special Agreement on account
of the Court's failure to constitute the chamber according to the
wishes of the parties."'
Furthermore, more problems surface in regard to the compati-
bility of the proposed declaration with the procedural law of the
World Court. Under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute, States
"recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agree-
ments," 85 the jurisdiction of the Court. In other words, a State,
which made a valid declaration of acceptance, may find itself sub-
jected to the obligations of the Optional Clause at any time.86 Under
this system, the contractual relations between the parties must be
established automatically, so that the terms on which a State bases
its recognition of the compulsory jurisdiction cannot be subject to
negotiation. 87 Therefore, a transaction, which appears to be a decla-
ration under Article 36, paragraph 2, but which contains or purports
to require elements of negotiation, is in fact incompatible with the
normalities of the Statute.88
The proposed reservation, however, presupposes that the parties
- after the dispute has arisen - agree on a common proposition
entailing the composition of the bench. The condition, in turn, man-
dates a phase of negotiation not present in the decision regarding
compulsory jurisdiction. Therefore, such a condition, which is inad-
missible, precludes this proposed clause from being regarded as a
valid declaration under Article 36, paragraph 2 of the Statute. 89 The
next problem considers, however, what the legal effects of such a
"declaration" would be.
It is possible that such an acceptance - while not a valid decla-
ration under Article 36, paragraph 2 due to its involvement with
mandatory negotiation - may nevertheless confer jurisdiction upon
the Court. Indeed a "declaration" under this provision, which entails
such negotiation, may be regarded as an acceptance of jurisdiction
under Article 36, paragraph 1 of the Statute.90 Moreover, the Court
has held that the acceptance of jurisdiction in a case is not subject to
84. Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Canada to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Art. 11, 20 ILM 1377 (1981). Thus in order to be
compatible with the Statute and the Rules, the declaration would have to force the other party
to agree to discontinue the case if the Court does not act in accordance with the reached
agreement as to the composition of the chamber.
85. Emphasis added.
86. 1957 I.C.J. 146.
87. 1 S. ROSENNE. THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE
371 (1965).
88. Id.
89. S. ROSENNE, supra note 87, at 371, n.I. The transaction as a whole is controlling,
not the formal text of the "declaration"; see the example of the "declarations" made by the
United Arab Republic (Egypt): 265 U.N.T.S. 299; 272 U.N.T.S. 224.
90. Crawford, supra note 69, at 83-84.
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the use of a specific form.91 In fact, nothing prevents a party to the
Optional Clause from entering into an agreement pertaining to both
the utilization and composition of such a chamber with a state which
has made a chamber reservation.92 An acceptance of such a chamber
"reservation declaration" would be similar to the system of compul-
sory jurisdiction between parties to the Statute and non-parties to
the Statute who recognize its jurisdiction. Notably, a declaration
under Article 36, paragraph 2 by such a non-member is only opposa-
ble to a member State (which has made a matching declaration
under Art. 36, par. 2) if the latter explicitly agreed.93 Having deter-
mined the mode whereby a case can be submitted to a chamber,
inquiry into problems related to the composition of such an ad hoc
chamber must be made.
V. Composition of the Chamber
A. Ad Hoc Chambers and Article 9 Statute
It is questionable to what extent Article 9 of the Statute, which
proscribes that the ICJ should represent the main forms of civiliza-
tion and the principal legal systems, applies to ad hoc chambers. One
criticism concerning the adjudication of the United States and Ca-
nada in the Gulf of Maine Case was that the chamber consisted only
of Western judges.94 Although the chamber was representative of
different legal systems in the Frontier Dispute Case (Burkina Faso v.
Mali)9" and the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Case (El Salva-
dor v. Honduras), 96 it was devoid of diversity in the Elettronica
Sicula Case (Italy v. US).97
Articles 26 and 27 of the Statute of the PCIJ, concerning labor,
transit and communications chambers, stated that such chambers
should be established "so far as possible with due regard to the pro-
visions of Article 9." However, the Statute of the ICJ provides that
the provisions of Article 9 apply only to the election of Judges of the
91. S. ROSENNE, supra note 88, at 371; PCIJ (ser A), No. 15, at 22-3 (Upper Silesia -
Minority Schools); 1947/48 I.C.J. 27 (Corfu Channel - Preliminary Objections). This cre-
ates the possibility of forum prorogatum.
92. This would require, however, a coexistence of subject-matter of the two declarations.
93. See S. ROSENNE, supra note 87, Appendix 7, 872 (Security Council Resolution 9(l)
of 15 October 1946).
94. Judges Ago (Italy), Gros (France), Mosler (Federal Republic of Germany), Schwe-
bel (USA) and Judge ad hoc Cohen (Canada).
95. Judges Lachs (Poland), Ruda (Argentina), and Bedjaoui (Algeria); Judges ad hoc
Luchaire (France) and Abi-Saab (Egypt).
96. Judges Sette Camara (Brazil), Oda (Japan) and Jennings (United Kingdom); Judge
ad hoc Valtikos (Greece); Information about the successor to Judge ad hoc Virally (France),
who died on 27 January 1989.1.C.J. Communique No. 89/2 is not available at that point.
97. Judges Ago (Italy), Schwebel (USA), Jennings (United Kingdom) and Oda (Ja-
pan). The vacancy in the chamber resulting from the death of Judge Singh (India) on Dec. 1I,
1988 was filled by Judge Ruda (Argentina).
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Court by the General Assembly and the Security Council. Neither
Article 26 of the Statute nor Section E on Proceedings before the
Chambers in the Rules of Court ("Proceedings") contain any refer-
ence to Article 9 of the Statute. This lack of diversity may be justi-
fied. Due to the limited number of judges in a chamber98 it may be
impossible to comply with the provisions of Article 9.99 Furthermore,
it is hardly conceivable that the Court based on Article 9 of the
Statute, would disregard the suggestions of the parties. 00 However,
it has been suggested that the parties in such a case should pay heed
to the provisions of the article."' 1
B. Number of Judges to Form an Ad Hoc Chamber
In each of the previous four cases adjudicated by ad hoc cham-
bers of the ICJ, the number of judges has been five. The number five
is not proscribed, however, by the Statute.
Under Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute, the number of
judges constituting an ad hoc chamber is determined by the Court
with the approval of the parties. The drafters of the Statute rejected
the attempt to insert a fixed number in the Statute.0 2 The travaux
preparatoires even show that the drafters envisioned a chamber con-
sisting of only one judge, provided that the parties agree."0 ' How-
ever, Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute provides that a chamber
is constituted of judges, the plural of which excludes a one-judge
chamber."0" Article 13, paragraph 3 of the Rules confirms this inter-
pretation, where it states that the ICJ will determine the number of
its Members to constitute the chamber. In contrast, an argumentum
e contrario may be drawn from Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Stat-
ute which determines a minimum of judges for chambers dealing
with particular categories of cases.
In accordance with Article 26, paragraph 1 of the Statute, it is
possible for a chamber to be composed of three judges; two would be
chosen by each of the parties respectively, and the third would be
elected by the Court and would be president of the chamber.0 "' Only
98. See infra V, B.
99. Evensen, The International Court of Justice Main Characteristics and its Contri-
bution to the Development of the Modern Law of Nations, 57 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 3, 10
(1988).
100. Evensen, id. See also supra note 30 (all citations).
101. Evensen, id., Bedjaoui, LA JURIDICTION INTERNATIONALE PERMANENTE (Soc.
Franc. Dt. Int., ed.) 73, 78 (1987).
102. Schwebel, supra note 4, at 851.
103. Doc. Jurist 32, G/24, 273; Doc. 57, G/45, 199-200; Schwebel, supra note 4, at
833. This position was in particular supported by the representative of the USSR.
104. Schwebel, supra note 4, at 833, n.8.
105. Hyde, supra note 27, at 440; Ar~chaga, supra note 30, at 3, Ar~chaga, JUDICIAL
SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES 68 (H. Mosler, R. Bernhardt, ed. 1974); Jessup, supra note 30, at
561; Gross, JUDICIAL SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTEs 57 (H. Mosler, R. Bernhardt ed.); Schwebel,
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Rosenne is of the opinion that the 1978 Rules do not permit the
previously described formulation.10 6 According to Rosenne, the 1972
Rules delegate to the ICJ broad powers to form a chamber, °7 in-
cluding the power to form a one member ad hoc chamber."0 8 He
ignores the 1978 Rules, however. Under the 1978 Rules the role of
the Court in determining the number of its members to constitute a
chamber is limited. Article 31 of the Statute limits the number of
judges to be chosen by each of the parties to one.0 9 Thus, in con-
junction with Article 17, paragraph 3 of the 1978 Rules, the possi-
bility of a one-member chamber is excluded.
The solution for this problem may be found in Articles 31 and
26, of the Statute. Pursuant to Article 31 of the Statute, one to two
of the judges on the ICJ must volunteer to serve as a member of the
chamber, in addition to the judge ad hoc to be chosen by the party
which has no national on the bench.'10 The procedure as exercised
mandates that then initial number of judges on a chamber be more
than one. Also due to the required procedure, the chamber may end
up consisting of one member of the Court and two judges ad hoc.
Finally, the determination of the number of judges depends
upon the approval of the parties. In practice, the parties may also
determine, through the approval procedure, the final composition of
the chamber.
C. Composition Strictu Senso of the Chamber
The extent of the parties' influence as to the actual composition
of the chamber was both the most important and the most criticized
feature of the Rules, when revisions of the Rules of Court took place
in 1972 and in 1978. This feature of the Rules was strengthened by
its use in the Gulf of Maine Case (United States v. Canada). The
United States and Canada submitted their dispute to the ICJ Cham-
ber, but at the same time retained an "escape" mechanism to elimi-
nate the risk that the Court would elect a chamber that did not meet
supra note 4, at 351; Ostrihansky, supra note I, at 35; Oellers-Frahm, supra note 4, at 317,
n.7.; Hambro, Quelques Obsbrvations sur la rbvision du Rfglement de la Cour Internationale
de Justice, 125, 130; MtLANGES OFFERTS A CHARLES ROUSSEAU (1974).
106. S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 43.
107. Article 17, paragraph I Rules 1972.
108. And only if there is no Member of the Court possessing the nationality of that
party, Art. 31 paragraph 3 of the Statute.
109. S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 43.
110. G. GUYOMAR, supra note 15, at 71. This procedure was followed in the Gulf of
Maine Case, 1982 I.C.J. 10 (Order of 20 January 1982). However, in the Frontier Dispute
and the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Case, the I.C.J. only elected three of the five
members of the Chamber and further declared that the judges together with the two judges ad
hoc chosen by the parties form the chamber, 1985 I.C.J. 7 (Frontier Dispute) and 1987 I.C.J.
12 (Land, Island and Maritime Frontier).
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their preferences:"' If the chamber had not been composed in accor-
dance with the wishes of the parties, or if a vacancy had not been
filled in such a manner, then the parties would have discontinued the
proceedings and would have instead resorted to dispute settlement by
an arbitral tribunal. 12 Similarly, El Salvador and Honduras, in their
Special Agreement of May 26, 1986 stipulated:
[L]as Partes someten las cuestiones [. . . a una Sala de la
Corte Internacional de Justicia, compuesta por tres miembros,
con la anuencia de las Partes, las cuales la expresaran en forma
conjunta al Presidente de la Corte, siendo esta conformidad es-
encial para la integracion de la Sala [. .. ]11
The Statute only contemplates that the number of judges will be
determined with the approval of the parties. As to the composition of
the chamber, the Statute is silent. The Rules, however, in Article 17,
paragraph 2, ask the President to "ascertain [the parties] views re-
garding the composition of the Chamber and he shall report to the
Court accordingly." The first problem in interpreting this phrase is
whether such consultation is praeter or contra legem. If Article 17,
paragraph 2 of the Rules is not in conformity with the Statute then
Article 17, paragraph 2 and any subsequent action based upon it
would be ultra vires, and thus, null and void." 4 In order to obtain
the parties' approval as to the number of judges of the chamber,
however, consultation is unavoidable, which means that the subject
of consultation with the parties is within the purview of the
Statute.'
1 5
Furthermore, Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute is open to
two contradictory interpretations. On one side, the approval of the
parties refers only to the number of judges, but not to the composi-
tion of the chamber. On the other side, the Statute does not ex-
pressly or impliedly prohibit consultation as to the composition of
judges." 6 While the drafting history of the Statute is unclear" 7 and
the travaux preparatoires of the Rules are not published," 8 the Gen-
I 1. Brauer, supra note 4, at 483; but McWhinney, Special Chambers within the Inter-
national Court of Justice: The Preliminary Procedural Aspect of the Gulf of Maine Case, 12
SYRACUSE J, INT'L L. AND COMMERCE 1, 7-11 (1985).
112. Treaty Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of Canada to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime
Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, Art. I and Ill, 20 ILM 1377 (1981).
113. "The parties submit the questions . . . to a chamber of the International Court of
Justice, which is composed of three members, with the consent of the Parties, who express such
consent in joint form to the President of the Court, such consent being an essential condition
for the creation of the chamber." [Translation by the author.]
114. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 393.
115. Id.
116. Schwebel, supra note 4, at 852.
117. Schwebel, supra note 4, at 834 and 852.
118. For a complaint in that respect see G. GUYOMAR, supra note 15, at XVil.
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eral Assembly by consensus accepted that the new Rules provide
"for greater influence of the parties on the composition of ad hoc
chambers," which is in accordance with the Statute." 9 General As-
sembly acceptance is of special importance, considering the fact that
the Court is, under Article 92 of the Charter, the principal judicial
organ of the United Nations. Furthermore, seven States, by their
participation in such proceedings, have currently expressed their
opinio juris as to the compatibility of this procedure with the Stat-
ute. '2 Moreover, the ICJ itself, by adopting the 1978 Rules, has
treated consultations with the parties "as to the composition of the
proposed chambers" as "in accordance with Article 26, paragraph 2
of the Statute."'' ICJ approval is of particular importance in light
of Article 38 of the Statute and in light of the deeply-rooted tradi-
tion of the Court to rely upon its own prior practice in procedural
matters.
While the parties may present their views regarding the compo-
sition of the chamber, it is the Court which, by the terms of Article
26, paragraph 1 of the Statute, may form the chamber. The ICJ also
controls the chambers as the number of the judges is finally deter-
mined by the Court itself, and since elections of the members of the
chamber must take place by secret ballot. These powers of the Court
are in a position of tension with the powers of the parties to with-
draw a case under Articles 88 and 89 of the Rules, especially since
the Court has previously held that the ICJ is not called upon to in-
quire into the motives of such a withdrawal.' Thus, both sides re-
tain their full discretion; "it is inevitable, that if a chamber is to be
viable, its composition must result from a consensus between the par-
ties and the Court."' 2 3 This consensus has more easily developed in
119. G.A. Res. 3232, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31) at 141-42.
120. At this moment, consultations between the five permanent members of the Security
Council are under consideration to submit themselves for specific questions to the jurisdiction
of the Court. This proposal would also foresee the chamber procedure, see statement of Abra-
ham Sofaer, Legal Adviser U.S. Department of State to the Panel at the Annual Meeting of
the ASIL on "Current Developments concerning the Settlement of Disputes involving States
by Arbitration and the World Court" on April 8, 1989.
121. 1987 l.C.J. 4; 1987 I.C.J. 12; not even Judges Morozov and EI-Khani in their re-
spective Dissenting Opinions to the Order constituting the Gulf of Maine Chamber, 1982
I.C.J. 12 and 13, questioned the consulting procedure per se.
122. 1964 I.C.J. 19-20 (Barcelona Traction): "[...] these provisions [on discontinu-
ance] are concerned solely with the "how, not the "why" of the matter. They impose no condi-
tions as to the basis on which a discontinuance may be effected."; Wegen, supra note 83, at
331; Zoller, supra note 4, at 313-14; declaration of Judge Oda, 1987 I.C.J. 13. A problem may
arise, however, in a situation where a vacancy is not filled in accordance with the wishes of the
parties, but where the chamber is then able to reach a final decision before the parties are able
to discontinue the proceedings, Zoller, id.; such decision would constitute a valid binding deci-
sion of the Court; see also S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 43.
123. Judge Oda, id. The fact that the Court will not act according to some kind of
"dictate" - as put forward by Judges Morozov and EI-Khani 1982 I.C.J. 12 and 13, was
stressed by the Court in another context, 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 336-37 and 347 (Application for
Review of Judgment No. 273 - Advisory Opinion); Oellers-Frahm, supra note 4, at 322.
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the last three chamber proceedings. 124
D. Chambers and Judges Ad Hoc
Under the Statute of the PCIJ, the system of judges ad hoc had
been foreseen from the beginning for Articles 26 and 27 specialized
chambers. The Chamber for Summary Procedure provisions in the
Statute did not contain references to the system of judges ad hoc
during the elaboration of the Rules; some judges argued that partici-
pation of judges ad hoc was not excluded, notwithstanding silence in
the Statute.125 They contended that the Chamber for Summary Pro-
cedure acted as the Court, and that Article 31 of the Statute did not
expressly exclude such judges ad hoc. However, the majority of the
judges argued that Article 31 was not applicable.126 This view was
supported by the wording of Article 15, paragraph 2 of the Statute,
according to which the composition of the Chamber for Summary
Procedure was not subject to change by the parties. 27 During the
drafting of the protocol of revision of the Statute, a new Article 31
was introduced, which gave rise to the system of judges ad hoc in the
Chamber for Summary Procedure.12 8
The Interallied Committee of Jurists' proposal for the creation
of regional chambers with five members of the Court, consisting of
at least two deputy judges out of the region and two judges ad
hoc,"' was not retained. Instead, Article 31, paragraph 4 of the
Statute of the ICJ provided that the general provisions concerning
Judges ad hoc were paramount and take precedence over the provi-
sions in Articles 26 and 29. The system of such judges ad hoc would
be applied, as follows: the President would request one or two mem-
bers of the Court to step aside and to give their authority to the
judges chosen by the parties.' This somewhat bizarre procedure'31
was followed by the Court in the Gulf of Maine Case.'32 In both the
124. The critique of Judge EI-Khani, 1983 I.C.J. 12 referring to the fact that due to the
composition of the chamber, more than one judge of the same nationality was acting in the
name of the Court, is unfounded, since Art. 17, par. 4 Rules can be considered as lex specialis
to Art. 3, par. I Statute.
125. President Loder, Judges Anzilotti and Huber, P.C.I.J. (ser. D), No. 2, 32 and 192.
126. The vote was 9:3, P.C.I.J., id., 193.
127. Lachume, Le Juge "Ad Hoc", 70 REV. GtN. DT. INT. PUBL. 266, 281 (1966). He
argues that this is one of the reasons for the lack of use of the Chamber for Summary Proce-
dure - but see supra 1, (2) and the non-use of the other chambers.
128. Cassin, La rvision du Statut de la CPJI, 36 REV. GEN. DT. INT. PUBL., 377, 393
(1929). Cassin argues that this was a logical consequence of the chamber system. However,
this reform did not improve the popularity of this chamber, supra 1, 2.
129. 40 A.J.I.L. (1946), supp., 8.
130. Article 31, paragraph 4 Statute.
131. G. GUYOMAR, supra note 15, at 71.
132. In one order, the Court declared that the chamber has elected, inter alia, Judge
Ruda to be member of the chamber ad that he has been requested to give place to the Cana-
dian judge ad hoc Cohen, Judge Ruda having expressed his readiness to do so, 1982 I.C.J. 9-
10. According to the text of the Statute, there appears to be no obligation of the judge in
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Frontier Dispute Case and the Land, Island and Maritime Boundary
Case, the Court chose a different route, electing only three members
of the chamber of five judges, and leaving two places for nominees of
the parties.133 While the reasons for the difference in practice are not
clear,134 the distinction may be based upon frequent statements by
the Court that it is not bound procedurally in the same manner as
domestic courts.1 35
Once a judge ad hoc has become member of the chamber, 3' the
extent of his powers may be limited. It is clear that a judge ad hoc
may only participate in a decision exclusively dealing with the case
for which he had been chosen. 37 Beyond this determination, a judge
ad hoc chosen for an ad hoc chamber may not be entitled to be "pre-
sent" in the full Court when the Court takes decisions on that case.
The judge may be precluded from voting but may participate in the
deliberations. For instance, the Order of the ICJ of February 1, 1982
in the Gulf of Maine Case on the written pleadings procedure only
mentions Judge ad hoc Cohen as "in attendance at the invitation of
the Court" and "expressing support for the Order which the Court
had just adopted." '38 In the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier
Dispute, the Court was more cautious, and did not invite the two
judges ad hoc "to attend" the meeting of the Court fixing the time-
limits for the filing of the memorials."' 9
It must be noted that a judge ad hoc can only act after he has
made the solemn declaration under Article 20 of the Statute, as
foreseen in Article 31, paragraph 6 of the Statute. Article 8, para-
graph 2 of the Rules stipulates that this declaration shall be made, if
the case is to be dealt with by a chamber, in the chamber. This
means that the judges ad hoc can only act after the chamber has
been formed. 140 After that moment, Article 31, paragraph 6 of the
question to give place. See the wording "request" in Art. 31, par. 4 and the language of the
Order: "Judge Ruda indicated his readiness to do so."
133. 1985 I.C.J. 10; 1987 I.C.J. 6, 7. In the Elettronica Sicula Case, both parties were
already represented on the bench (Judge Schwebel for the US, Judge Ago for Italy).
134. Ostrihansky, supra note 1, at 45.
135. 1963 I.C.J. 28; P.C.I.J. (ser. A), No. 2, at 34.
136. In case such a judge dies or becomes unable to exercise his functions, the party in
question seems to be entitled to choose a successor without any further acts by the Court.
I.C.J. Press Communique, No. 89/2 referring to the right of Honduras to choose a successor
for Judge ad hoc Virally.
137. G. GUYOMAR, supra note 15, at 105 referring e.g., to administrative or budgetary
issues; see also Art. 20, par. 3 of the Rules: Judges ad hoc are "[...] bound [...] to attend
all meetings held in the case in which they are participating." Id.
138. 1982 I.C.J. Rep. 15-16; this order exists in two versions, Version A (see photoprints
in 21 ILM (1982) 76-77) and Version B (id., 602 = 1982 I.C.J. 15-16) - Version A does not
mention Judge Cohen in the heading and does not make any reference to the "support" of
Judge Cohen; see G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 690, Exc. A.
139. 1987 I.C.J. 15.
140. Article I of the Treaty between the Government of the United States of America
and the Government of Canada to Submit to Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of
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Statute rules that such judges "shall take part in the decision on
terms of complete equality with their colleagues." Therefore, accord-
ing to this rationale, the non-participation of such a judge ad hoc in
decisions rendered by the Court, but related to the case dealt with by
the chamber, is incompatible with the Statute."' The PCIJ, how-
ever, in the Electricity Company of Sofia Case, held that when the
issue before the Court was only a question of orders related to the
administration of the case, and not a "decision" which settles the
case, the presence of a judge ad hoc is not required. 4" Thus, the
approach of the Court in the Gulf of Maine Case is in accordance
with the settled practice of the Court. 4"
The judge ad hoc would probably not be in a position to take
part in an election to fill a vacancy in the chamber. 4 " It is settled
procedure of the Court that any judge ad hoc may not participate in
"decisions" related generally to the composition of the bench. A
judge ad hoc may not participate in a vote concerning whether the
other party is entitled to be represented by a judge ad hoc,145 nor
may he vote on the question of Presidency, if the term of a President
of the Court is about to expire.146 These voting rules are confirmed
by Article 6 of the Rules, which proscribes that only Members of the
Court are allowed to take part in a vote on the dismissal of a judge.
The Rules further stipulate that the member of the Court who ob-
tained "the largest number of votes constituting a majority of the
Members of the Court composing it at the time of the election, "1 7
shall fill the vacancy. Thus, in accordance with the practice of the
Court, this provision excludes judges ad hoc from voting.148
the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine Area, 20 ILM 1377 (1981), which stipulates
that "the Chamber shall be deemed to have been constituted when the Parties notify the Reg-
istrar of the name of the judges ad hoc" seems to be at the least misleading, since it is the
Court which decides whether and when to form a chamber. It is not clear whether Judge ad
hoc Cohen had already made the solemn declaration before February 1, 1982.
141. S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 51; Zoller, supra note 4, at 316.
142. PCIJ (ser. E) No. 16 at 180.
143. The pure "presence" of a judge ad hoc does not seem to create specific legal
problems, unless he would participate in the deliberations, which would be excluded under
Article 54, paragraph 3 of the Statute. The wording of the order, mentioned above, "order
which the Court had just adopted," seems to indicate the contrary. Therefore, there may be no
problem of compatibility with Art. 54, par. 2 and 3 Statute and Art. 21, par. 2 Rules; but see
S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 27.
144. The following arguments also apply to a situation where an ad hoc chamber is
established during consideration of a dispute by the full Court including a judge ad hoc, since
in both cases Article 18, par. 1 Rules is applicable.
In the two situations, where vacancies in chambers occurred, the problem did not arise: in
the Elettronica Sicula Case, no judge ad hoc was member of the chamber; in the Land, Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute Case, the vacancy concerned a judge ad hoc, the successor to
be chosen by Honduras.
145. P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No. 5 at 238.
146. P.C.I.J. (ser. E) No. 7, at 281.
147. Article 18, paragraph I Rules.
148. S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 44, argues that this practice violates Art. 31 Statute;
in contrast hereto, Ostrihansky, supra note I, at 40 submits that the voting power extends to
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VI. Separation of Powers Between the Court and Ad Hoc
Chambers
The powers of the Court and the powers of the chamber are not
clearly delineated by the Rules, especially during the initial phases
of a case. Lacking any specific authority in the Rules, it has been the
President of the Court who has opened the first session of ad hoc
chambers.149
According to Article 92, paragraph 1 of the Rules, the time lim-
its concerning the delivery of pleadings "shall be fixed by the Court
or by the President if the Court is not sitting." Assuming that the
chamber concerned has been formed, the chamber and the possible
judge ad hoc' 50 shall be consulted. In three of the four cases, it was
the entire Court which determined these time limits. 51
The power to extend such a time limit is not exhaustively dealt
with by the Rules. Under Article 44, paragraph 3 of the Rules, it is
the Court which may do so, but if the Court has been adjourned, this
power shall be exercised by its President. Since the President of a
chamber is to exercise Presidential powers with respective to cases
dealt with by a chamber, 52 it was Judge Ago, the president of the
chamber in the Gulf of Maine Case, who exercised this function. 5
Most striking is the fact that the chamber in the Land, Island
and Maritime Frontier Dispute fixed the time limits for the filing of
counter-memorials and replies. 5" This procedure contradicts Article
45, paragraph 2 of the Rules, whereby the Court may authorize re-
plies and rejoinders. There is no Rule whereby the chamber would
be entitled to do so, nor is there any authorization by the Court.
Here again, as in the procedure for electing judges ad hoc, the Court
has taken a more pragmatic approach in applying its own rules, a
the judge ad hoc, which - according to him - would violate Article 31 paragraph 6 Statute.
We cannot fully explore this question since the notion of "decision" as utilized in the Statute,
due to its manifold use, is still unclear, see, e.g., Art. 94 UN-Charter, Arts. 16, 17, 24, 35 Par.
5 and 6, 36 par. 6, and 41 Statute.
149. Pillepich, supra note 4, at 70; in the Elettronica Sicula case, Judge Singh, then
President of the I.C.J., was himself a member of the chamber and became thus automatically
its President, Article 18, paragraph 2 Rules. It may be noted, that the chamber, when entering
for a public sitting, is announced as "The Court." Bedjaoui, supra note 101, at 77.
150. See supra note 150.
151. Gulf of Maine: Order of Feb. I, 1982.
Elettronica Sicula: Order of March 2, 1987.
Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute: Order of May 27, 1987.
Only in the Border Dispute Case, the President acted:
Order of April 4, 1987.
But see S. ROSENNE, supra note 28, at 248, where he stresses the incompatibility with the
chamber's independence and Ostrihansky, supra note 1, at 50 referring to a speeding up by the
decision of the Court/President of the Court.
152. Article 18, par. 3 Rules.
153. Order of July 28, 1982: 1982 I.C.J. 557.
154. Order of May 29, 1987.
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questionable arrangement. 55 Finally, it is again the Court which is
authorized under Article 54, paragraph 1 of the Rules to determine
the date of opening of the oral proceedings.56
VII. Transfer of a Case from the Court to an Ad Hoc Chamber
(and vice versa)
A. Transfer of a Case from the Court to a Chamber
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute empowers the Court to
form an ad hoc chamber at any time. Requests that cases be referred
to one of the Court's chambers were governed by Article 35 of the
1922-1931 Rules of the PCIJ, in which it was implied that such de-
mands should be made either in the special agreement or in the ap-
plication. Under the 1936 version of the Rules, such a request had to
be made at the commencement of a proceeding, though not necessa-
rily in the document instituting the proceeding.1 57 This excluded the
possibility that a proceeding instituted before the full Court might
later be transferred to a chamber.1 58
While the 1946 Rules of the ICJ did not make any specific ref-
erence to this transfer problem, the 1972 Rules, as well as the 1978
Rules, allow the parties to file a request for the formation of a cham-
ber until the closure of the written proceedings. 159 Rosenne argues
that the closure of the written proceedings may be too early, espe-
cially if there has been only one round of written pleadings. 10 He
also argues that since the Statute does not impose such a strict time
limit, the Court should allow the parties to agree before the opening
of the oral proceedings, but after all written proceedings have been
filed, to transfer the case to an ad hoc chamber.' The Court, how-
ever, is bound by its own Rules, and cannot proprio motu deviate
from them. 62 The only authority for the Court to adhere to such an.
agreement of the parties is under Article 101 of the Rules, if the
Court considers such modification appropriate. While this problem is
at least partially regulated by the Statute and the Rules, the inverse
situation or transfer from a chamber to the Court, is not expressly
mentioned in the Statute and the Rules.
155. Supra note 135.
156. See, e.g., Press Communiqud no. 89/1 concerning Elettronica Sicula.
157. Art. 71, par. I Rules 1936; P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2 (3.Add.) at 136.
158. M. HUDSON, supra note 13, at 295.
159. Art. 76, par. 3 Rules 1972; Art. 17, par. I Rules 1978.
160. See Arts. 44 and 45 Rules.
161. S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 42-43; but see also S. ROSENNE, supra note 87, at
591, where he took a stricter view; and Ostrihansky, supra note 1, at 48.
162. 1963 I.C.J. 27-28.
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B. Transfer of a Case from a Chamber to the Full Court
It is doubtful that a request to transfer the case from an ad hoc
chamber to the full Court can be made by the parties. 163 This seems
to be unjust, for it is more important to ensure a fair and just trial
than to speed up the proceedings by referring the case to a chamber.
Furthermore, the need for such transfer may arise whenever a va-
cancy in an ad hoc chamber is not filled in accordance with the
wishes of the parties.'64
Article 16, paragraph 3 of the Rules provides that a chamber
hearing a case arising under article 26, paragraph 1 of the Statute
may not be dissolved before it has finished that case pending before
it. Thus, it may be argued e contrario that the Court in fact does
have the power to transfer a case from an ad hoc chamber. This
argument is even more convincing because a discontinuance and pos-
sible resubmittal of the case to the full Court would constitute an
unnecessary formality.' 6 5 Concerning time limits for such a transfer,
the Court would most probably have to apply Article 17, paragraph
1 of the Rules by analogy to apply the time limit of this kind of
transfer, especially since this time limit is also mentioned in other
parts of the Rules.' 66
VIII. Ad Hoc Chambers and the Exercise of Incidental
Jurisdiction
There are several different forms of incidental jurisdiction.' 67
The chamber's power to exercise these forms of jurisdiction, how-
ever, is not fully delineated.
A. Interim Measures of Protection
For the first time in the history of the World Court an ad hoc
chamber of the Court indicated interim measures of protection under
Article 41 of the Statute in the Frontier Dispute Case. 6 8 Since
under the Statute of the PCIJ there is only provision for the exercise
163. Ostrihansky, supra note 1, at 46 and 48, denies such a possibility.
164. The United States and Canada in their Special Agreement had foreseen the refer-
ral of the dispute to an arbitral tribunal in such a situation, Article Ill, Treaty between the
Government of the United States of America and the Government of Canada to Submit to
Binding Dispute Settlement the Delimitation of the Maritime Boundary in the Gulf of Maine
Area, 20 I.L.M. 1377 (1981).
165. Ostrihansky, supra note 1, at 48, submits that this is the only possibility for such a
transfer.
166. See, e.g., Art. 37, par. 3.
167. On the notion of incidental jurisdiction in general see Briggs, supra note 76,
passim.
168. See in general in respect to that order Gautron, supra note 4, at 203-06 (1986);
Gross, Some Observations on Provisional Measures, INTERNATIONAL LAW AT A TIME OF PER-
PLEXITY - ESSAYS IN HONOR OF SHABTAI S. ROSENNE, (Dinstein, ed. 1989).
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of summary procedure by a chamber,169 the question of indicating
interim measures of protection by this or another chamber never be-
came relevant. Several authors, however, have argued that any deci-
sion as to interim measures were to be taken by the full Court.17
In the Frontier Dispute Case, the ad hoc chamber based its
power to take interim measures on Article 90 of the Rules which
provides the procedure for contentious cases by analogy to such
chambers. 17 The chamber stressed that its power to take interim
measures did not depend upon agreement of the parties once the
chamber had been validly seised. Accordingly, the powers of the
President of the Court under Article 74, paragraph 4 to demand that
the parties not undermine later possible measures by the Court could
be exercised by the president of the chamber. 7
A problem may arise, however, when the request for such mea-
sures is made while the chamber has not yet been formed. Several
provisions of the Rules,' as well as the practice of the Court, show
that the Court is empowered to attach urgency to interim proceed-
ings.'74 Thus, the Court may decline to appoint a judge ad hoc for
such urgent proceedings. 17 5 Similarly, the Court only needs to assert
its jurisdiction in a provisional way.1 71 It would be similarly inade-
quate to postpone interim measures pending the formation of an ad
hoc chamber, since experience shows that the required consultations
with the parties as to the number and composition of the chamber
may take a significant period of time. Dictum of the PCIJ confirms
this rationale: "[T]he Court is entitled, as normally composed, to
indicate interim* measures of protection."' 77
B. Jurisdiction under Article 36, paragraph 5 of the Statute
When a case is to be adjudicated by an ad hoc chamber, the
problem of whether the chamber or the full Court will decide juris-
diction arises. There are several arguments in favor of the chamber's
169. Treaty of Neuilly, P.C.I.J. (ser. A.) No. 3 and 4.
170. E. DUMBAULD, INTERIM MEASURES OF PROTECTION 157 (1932); A. FACHIRI, THE
PERMANENT COURT OF INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 100 (2nd. ed., 1932); M. HUDSON, supra note
13 at 427; the only question which arose was whether the President of the Court would have
the power to indicate such measures in case the Court was not sitting.
171. 1986 l.C.J. 6; but see K. OELLERS-FRAHM, DIE EINSTWEILIGE ANORDNUNG IN DER
INTERNATIONALEN GERICHTSBARKEIT 1 (1975), where she states without reasons that only the
Court or the President would possibly have the power to make such orders.
172. See 1978 Rules Article 74, para. 4.
173. See, e.g., 1978 Rules, Art. 74, pars. 1, 2 and 4.
174. G. SCHWARZENBERGER, supra note 20, at 549.
175. P.C.I.J. (ser. A/B) No. 48, at 268: "[... in this case the presence of judges ad
hoc is not inconsistent with the urgent nature of interim measures of protection." Emphasis
added.
176. The latest example in that respect was the United States v. Nicaragua Case 1984
i.C.J. 179-180 (Request for Interim Protection).
177. P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 12, at 10 (emphasis added).
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power to decide its jurisdiction. First, any objections regarding the
jurisdiction of the ICJ can be raised until the time limit for the de-
livery of the Counter-Memorial. x7 8 Second, since only the chamber is
entitled to exercise jurisdiction as to the merits, the objection to ju-
risdiction may be joined to the merits and entitled jurisdiction.
Third, Article 90 of the Rules provides that the regular procedure of
contentious proceedings is applicable to the ad hoc chambers.1"9
Finally, even if the chamber has not been formed when an ob-
jection regarding the Court's jurisdiction is raised, the Court's prac-
tice shows that the Court can nevertheless take procedural steps,
such as indicating interim measures of protection, before it renders a
decision on its jurisdiction.18 Therefore, it is generally the chamber's
responsibility to determine the existence and extent of its
jurisdiction.
18 1
C. Intervention by a Third State
The Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Case (El Salvador v.
Honduras), concerned, among other things, the Bay of Fonseca and
the possible problem of an intervening third state in a case decided
by an ad hoc chamber. The intervention was a practical issue, since
the Bay of Fonseca has been administered severally by the two par-
ties and by Nicaragua since 1971.182 The intervention would engen-
der several problems, such as the problem of whether the full Court
or the chamber, must consider such a request, and the problem of
whether an intervening State may have an opportunity to influence
the composition of the chamber.
It is generally accepted that chamber procedure and interven-
tion by a third party are not per se incompatible.18 1 Since interven-
tion by a third party is incidental to the main proceeding, the inter-
vening State may not decide whether the case shall be decided by an
ad hoc chamber.18'
178. 1978 Rules Art. 79, par. 1.
179. This is confirmed by the exercise of another form of incidental jurisdiction (Statute
Art. 41) by ad hoc chambers, supra VIII, A.
180. 1957 I.C.J. Ill.
181. The only exception where the Court would not even be able to form a chamber is
where there is not prima facie any basis of jurisdiction. See, e.g., the Antarctic cases (U.K. v.
Chile, U.K. v. Argentina), 1956 I.C.J. 12 and 1956 I.C.J. 15, where the Court was not able to
join the proceedings due to an obvious lack of jurisdiction and could only strike the cases from
the general list. S. ROSENNE, supra note 87, at 551.
182. See Archiv der Gegenwart, December I1, 1986; see generally J. DELGADO, Docu-
MENTOS Y DOCTRINAS RELCACIONADOS CON EL PROBLEMA DE FRONTERAS EL SALVADOR -
HONDURAS 99-228 (1985).
183. W. FRITZEMEYER, DIE INTERVENTION VOR DEM INTERNATIONALEN GERICHTSHOF
84 (1984); W. LEDERMANN, DAS PROZESSRECHT DES STXNDIGEN INTERNATIONALEN GERICHT-
SHOFES 25 (1934); Friede, Die Intervention im Verfahren vor dem Standigen Internationalen
Gerichtshof, 3 ZAoRV 1, 52-55 (1933).
184. Friede, id. This problem was specifically addressed in the Draft Rules submitted to
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The power to decide whether a third party will be allowed to
intervene must be divided into two distinct situations: when a request
to intervene occurs prior to formation of the chamber and when a
request to intervene occurs after formation of the chamber. This dis-
tinction is critical, since States which are allowed to intervene under
Article 62 or 63 of the Statute must accept the state of the case at
the time the request is granted.185 This principle applies to a State
which is about to ask for permission to intervene. Therefore, the re-
quest will be judged by the chamber if such chamber had been al-
ready formed. The interest of the intervening State that its request
for intervention is not decided by a chamber with a composition in-
fluenced by the main parties is protected by several provisions of the
Rules. The application for permission to intervene must be filed as
quickly as possible,186 yet the Court is bound to decide upon such an
application as a matter of priority. 8 ' Thus, in practice, the applica-
tion will be considered by the full Court before the chamber is
formed, unless the application is filed late.1 88
A second issue is whether a State, admitted as an intervener
before the chamber is formed, can influence the composition of the
chamber.1 89 An intervention under Article 62 of the Statute must be
distinguished from an intervention under Article 63 of the Statute.
Article 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute and the corresponding provi-
sions of the Rules stipulate that the parties can, in one way or an-
other, influence the composition of the chamber. Thus, the question
arises whether an intervener can be legitimately regarded as a party.
It is certain that a state which is about to ask for permission to
intervene under Article 62 is not yet a party to the case. 90 Once a
State is admitted for reasons of intervention under Article 62 of the
Statute, the situation is less clear. The original wording of Article 62
of the Statute of the PCIJ provides that a State may request permis-
the P.C.I.J. by M. Nyholm, Article 8: "The limits of the jurisdiction of the [...] Chambers
[. .. ] shall be fixed by agreement between the parties. The principal parties shall inform the
President or the Court of their proposals; the consent of intervening parties shall not be re-
quired." P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2, at 356.
185. S. ROSENNE, supra note 87, at 443; V. MANI, INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 273
(1980).
186. 1978 Rules, Art. 81, para. I, in regarding to Statute Art. 62; Rules, art. 82, para.
I, in regard to Statute Art. 63.
187. Rules, Art. 84, par. 1.
188. Prima facie such decision by the full Court would go beyond the jurisdiction of the
Court, since the main parties had only granted jurisdiction to a chamber of the Court. It
should be noted, however, that the decision on such application for intervention is an exercise
of incidental jurisdiction and thus is based solely on Arts. 62 or 63 of the Statute, Briggs,
supra note 76, at 93.
189. In case the State is admitted at a stage where the chamber had already been
formed, the just mentioned principle applies, i.e. that the State has to participate in the pro-
ceedings as they were when said State was admitted.
190. 1981 I.C.J. 6-7, where the request of Malta for the nomination of a judge ad hoc
was denied.
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sion "to intervene as a third party." The French text, however, never
contained any corresponding phrase. Since both texts are authen-
tic, 191 the authors seemingly assumed that a State permitted to inter-
vene under Article 62 would become a "party." '92 On the other
hand, the Preface to the Proces-Verbaux of the Proceedings of the
Advisory Committee of Jurists, which was responsible for drafting
the Statute of the PCIJ, stated that the English text of the Proces-
Verbaux is to be considered only as a translation.19
During the drafting of the statute of the ICJ, the phrase "as a
third party" was deleted from the English text, since it was consid-
ered to be "misleading."' 94 The rapporteur of the committee at the
same time emphasized that the elimination of this phrase was not
intended to "change the sense thereof."' 95 Therefore, the guidance as
to conclusions that may be drawn from the wording of the Statute is
ambiguous.' 96
Article 65 of the 1936 Rules of Court provided that "the party
intervening" has a right to file a memorial. This choice of words was
abandoned in 1978, since Article 85 of the 1978 Rules speaks only of
the "intervening State." In the next sentence, however, the rules pro-
vide that the "parties" may furnish observations on the statement
"of the intervening State." Since the travaux preparatoires of the
rules of the ICJ have not been published, this interpretation is also
insecure. Article 85, paragraph I of the 1978 Rules stipulates that
the intervening State shall be supplied with copies of all relevant
documents, and that it shall be entitled to submit a written state-
ment; it is doubtful whether these rights are exclusive. 97
The decisive factor should be that the intervening State is also
bound by the judgment.'98 By allowing the main parties to determine
the composition of the chamber and thereby influence the outcome
of the binding judgment, while denying these rights to the interven-
191. P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 1.
192. 1981 I.C.J. 15; this is due to the fact that there is a presumption that all expres-
sions of the treaty in the different languages have the same meaning, Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, Art. 31, par. 3.
193. Proceedings, p. IV; everybody except Mr. Root spoke French during the proceed-
ings; furthermore, the records do not suggest, that in 1920, the drafters specifically had in
mind the idea of intervention as a party, Sep. Op. Oda, 1981 I.C.J. 24; Oda, Intervention in
the International Court of Justice: Articles 62 and 63 of the Statute, FESTSCHRIFT FUR H.
MOSLER 629, 641 (Bernhardt ed. 1983).
194. Statement by Mr. Read, Canada, chairman of the drafting committee, 14
U.N.C.I.O., at 204-15.
195. Id. at 676.
196. On the one hand, 1981 I.C.J. 15; on the other hand id. Sep. Op. Oda 23-24.
197. M. DUBISSON, LA COUR INTERNATIONALE DE JUSTICE 237 (1964) and J. SIMPSON
& H. Fox, INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION - LAW AND PRACTICE 187 (1959), seem to think
that these are the only rights of the intervening state; but see also W. FRITZEMEYER, supra
note 183, and 136, for a detailed argumentation to the contrary.
198. W. FRITZEMEYER, supra note 183, at 148 with further references.
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ing state, the basic principle of sovereign equality of the States in-
volved is jeopardized. The Court confirmed this by stating that it
considers a State admitted under Article 62 as a party.199 As a result
the intervening third State would enjoy the full rights under Article
26 of the Statute and Articles 17-18 of the Rules.
The situation concerning an intervening State participating
under Article 63 of the Statute is different. Such a State does not
participate as a party on equal footing with the original litigant
States. This rule may be derived from both the travaux preparatoires
of the Statute 00 and from the practice of the Court in the S.S.
Wimbledon Case.20 1 Accordingly, this state may not exercise any in-
fluence as to the composition of the chamber, either while its appli-
cation is under consideration or after it has been admitted.
D. Interpretation and Revision of Judgments
Article 100 of the 1978 Rules provides that a request for the
interpretation or revision of a chamber's judgment shall be consid-
ered by that chamber. In the case of an ad hoc chamber under Arti-
cle 26, paragraph 2 of the Statute, a conceptual difficulty is
encountered.
The Chamber for Summary Procedure and the special cham-
bers under Article 26, paragraph I of the Statute are to be regarded
as continuing bodies in the same sense as the Court itself,20 2 in
which the individual composition at a given moment is incidental.
Therefore, that same chamber may interpret or revise its own prior
judgment. This result is confirmed by the practice of the PCIJ in the
Treaty of Neuilly Case. 3
Theoretically, an ad hoc chamber may become functus officio
and dissolve when the final judgment is delivered. 04 Articles 33 and
17 of the Statute do not answer this question. While it is true that
199. 1981 |.C.J. 15 and 18 (Tunisia/Libya Continental Shelf- Request for Permission
to intervene by Malta); see also Sep. Op. Mbaye, 1984 I.C.J. 39 (Libya/Malta Continental
Shelf - Request for Permission to intervene by Italy); Elios, The Limits of the Right of
Intervention in a Case before the International Court of Justice, FESTSCHRIFT FOR H. MOSLER
159, 167-68 (Bernhardt ed 1983); Ar6chage, Intervention under Art. 62 of the Statute of the
International Court of Justice, 453-54; Morelli, La Thorie Gnrale du Procs Internatio-
nale, 61 Hague Receuil 256, 321 (1937 I11).
200. 200 P.C.I.J. (ser. D) No. 2, at 216.
201. Poland was called an intervener, but not a party, P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1, p. 11; the
use of the term "intervening Party" in regard to Cuba in the Haya de La Torre Case, 1951
I.C.J. 72, amounts to a falsa demonstratio, Oda, supra note 193, at 644-45; the statements in
the literature unanimously deny the status of a party, see, e.g., Hambro, Intervention under
Art. 63 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, IL PROCESSO INTERNAZIONALE -
STUD! IN HONORE Di GAETANO MORELLI 387, 397 (XIV Comm. e Studi 1975); M. HUDSON,
supra note 13, at 422.
202. S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 45.
203. See supra II, B.
204. Oellers-Frahm, supra note 4, at 324; S. ROSENNE, supra note 23; Ostrihansky,
supra note 1, at 46.
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these articles foresee that judges shall continue to sit in all phases of
the case, the interpretation or revision is not a "phase" of the case,
but a new case in itself.20 5 Furthermore, the provisions apply to indi-
vidual judges but not to the chamber per se.
The prior practice of arbitral tribunals may reveal a solution to
this question. Scholars have argued that a court of arbitration like-
wise becomes functus officio upon the rendition of its award. The
continuing powers of interpretation or revision to be exercised after
the final judgment, depend, however, upon the terms of the compro-
mise.206 The Model Rules on Arbitral Procedure, drafted by the In-
ternational Law Commission, confirm this and provide: "A dispute
[regarding interpretation] may be submitted to the tribunal which
rendered the award. °2 0 7 Only if it was impossible to submit the dis-
pute to the arbitral tribunal would the parties refer the request for
an interpretation to another tribunal.208
The practice of international tribunals further confirms this pro-
cedure. In the UK/France Continental Shelf Case, the request for
interpretation was submitted to the Court of Arbitration three
months after its final judgment; indeed, the tribunal did not consider
itself being functus officio. 2 9 Thus, the question of when and under
what circumstances a tribunal becomes functus officio depends upon
the parties agreement. i
The practice followed in relation to ad hoc chambers of the ICJ
confirms this determination. The special agreement submitting the
Gulf of Maine Case to the ICJ demonstrates this in a particular
way. Canada and the United States agreed that, "in case of a dis-
pute regarding the extension of the maritime boundary seaward as
determined by the chamber of the ICJ, [ . .] either party may sub-
mit the question [ . .] to the chamber of five judges constituted in
accordance with this special agreement. '211 This language indicates
that the parties did not consider that the chamber became functus
officio with the judgment; they instead believed that the chamber
continued to exist for the purposes of the instrument granting juris-
205. See the numbering of the cases in the General List.
206. W. CARLSTON, THE PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 224 (1946).
207. Model Rules Art. 28, par. 1.
208. Model Rules, Art. 28, par. 2.
209. 18 U.N.R.I.A.A. 272; see also the Sabotage Cases before the German-American
Mixed Commissions, where the umpire stated, that the commission after rendering its decision
has not become functus officio, Mixed Claims Commissions 1933-1939 (United States v. Ger-
many) (Administr. Decisions) 1127 [cited in W. CARLSTON, supra note 206, at 227], the com-
mission had to deal with a large group of cases and may be thus regarded as semi-permanent;
see for the relevance of this distinction C. HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTER-
PRETED AND APPLIED BY THE U.S. 1962 (2nd ed. 1945).
210. C. DE VISSCHER, PROBLtMES D'INTERPRtTATION EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUB-
LIC 254 (1963); Trail Smelter Arbitral Tribunal, U.N.R.I.A.A. 1955 (March, 11, 1941).
211. 1984 I.C.J. 255, Art. VII (3).
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diction.212 In the Frontier Dispute Case the Court nominated experts
on April 9, 1987, pursuant to Article IV of the Special Agreement
between Burkina Faso and Mali, even though the ad hoc chamber
had previously rendered its judgment in December 1986.213 Thus,
the Court's practice demonstrates that the Court believes an ad hoc
chamber to remain intact upon judgment, and not to become ipso
facto functus officio with the rendering of the judgment.
The only prerequisite to the chamber's continuing vitality seems
to be that the instrument granting jurisdiction must have provided
for post-judgment functions of the chamber. Since the jurisdiction of
the chamber to deliver an interpretation or to revise its original judg-
ment is contained in Article 60 and 61 of the Statute, which grants
compulsory jurisdiction, this requirement is fulfilled even if not ex-
pressly provided for in the compromis. Therefore, an ad hoc chamber
is empowered to interpret or revise its own judgments.
This interpretation power presents a practical problem. No time
limit is found anywhere in the Statute for instituting a case of inter-
pretation, though this may be stipulated in a compromise. 14 The
only time limit in the Statute is found in Article 62, paragraph 5,
which stipulates a time limit of ten years after which, under all cir-
cumstances, a revision would be excluded. The term of office of a
member of the chamber may have expired when the question of in-
terpretation or revision arises. Since Articles 33 and 17 of the Stat-
ute do not address that problem,21 5 the judge whose office has ex-
pired is not entitled to remain in the chamber and may not be re-
elected to the chamber. 16 In order to cope with this difficulty, such
vacancies should be filled in accordance with Article 17, paragraph 3
and Article 17, paragraph 2 of the Rules. Article 17, paragraph 3
covers "any vacancies," also covering this situation.2 17
IX. Outlook and Conclusion
Some authors have expounded the idea that an ad hoc chamber
of the Court could be enabled to render advisory opinions,218 either
by an extensive interpretation of the Statute, 19 or by a delegation
from the Court to the chamber.22 0 While it is already questionable
212. Zoller, supra note 4, at 317; contra Oellers-Frahm, supra note 4, at 324.
213. 1987 I.C.J. 7.
214. S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 45.
215. See supra note II, C.
216. Ostrihansky, supra note 1, at 46.
217. In regard to judges ad hoc no specific problems occur.
218. C. JENKS, THE PROSPECTS OF INTERNATIONAL ADJUDICATION 128 (1964); Gross,
The International Court of Justice: Consideration of Requirements for Enhancing its Role in
the International Legal Order, 65 A.J.I.L. 253, 277 (1971).
219. Ostrihansky, supra note 1, at 52.
220. S. ROSENNE, supra note 23, at 215.
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whether the Court can render advisory opinions through one of its
chambers, 2 ' it is even less convincing that the Court can delegate
such a duty to an ad hoc chamber. This rationale depends upon the
fact that in an advisory opinion there is not a "case" in the sense of
Article 26 Statute, nor are there parties necessary to agree to the
number of judges.
It was written some years ago that the Court's time seems to be
running out, unless its ad hoc chambers open a road back to the
Court's former position in the life of the international community.22
This road has been opened in view of the recent cases considered by
such chambers, but it seems to have led to a point halfway between
adjudication and arbitration.2 3 The Court must take a long journey
on this road in order to clarify and solve some of the issues and
problems raised in this paper.
Considering the role of such ad hoc chambers within the struc-
ture of the Court brings to mind the basic principle in the field of
international adjudication: "In the present state of the law, a dispute
cannot be submitted to a tribunal, except with the consent of the
States concerned."224 Thus, the States may choose to what extent
they will select such a "necessary evil, ' 225 the ad hoc chamber proce-
dure. 26 On the other hand, the Court should not yield to any temp-
tation, in order to allure more clients, to go beyond the limits pro-
vided by the Statute and its own judicial function.
221. H. LAUTERPACHT. PROVISIONAL REPORT ON THE REVISION OF THE STATUTE OF
THE COURT 78 (1955).
222. Petren, supra note 30, at 75.
223. Schwebel, supra note 4, at 854; similar Legault, A Line for all uses: The Gulf of
Maine Boundary revisited, 40 INT'L. J. 461, 477 (1985).
224. 1949 I.C.J. 178.
225. Mosler, supra note 30, at 559.
226. See the four cases mentioned infra. But see also the four cases pending before the
full Court: Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua, reparations phase
(Nicaragua v. United States), 187 I.C.J. 188 (Order of November 18, 1987); Border and
Transborder Armed Actions (Nicaragua v. Honduras), 1988 l.C.J. 9 (Order of March 31,
1988); Nicaragua v. Costa Rica (discontinued); Guinea-Bisssau v. Senegal; Iran v. U.S.; Na-
uru v. Austrl. and a case brought by Denmark against Norway for the delimitation of the
maritime and continental shelf boundary between eastern Greenland and Jan Mayen Island.
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